Morbidity and mortality associated with consunipLion of alcoholic beverages constitute a substantial public health burden in the United States. An estimated 85 000 deaths per year are associated with drinking, induding car crashes, other unintentional injuries, homicide, suidde, and a range of diseases, partiailarly Lhose affecting the liver, panaeas, and heart.'"Â ll states have taxes spedfic to alcoholic beverages; some of these taxes are imposed primarily to generate revenue,^ whereas others are ostensibly intended to ¡n-omote public health and wellai-e by limiting alcohol consumption.'*M ore than 100 studies have examined the relationsliip between alcoholit-beverage prices (or alcohol tax rates as a surrogate for prices) and vaiioiis indices of sales or consumption of alcohol (see Babor et a]7 and Chaloupka et al . *f or recent reviews). With a few exceptions {e.g.. Saloniaa**), studies consistent^ find price or tax leveLs to be inversely related to sales or oinsumption of alcoholic bevcri^es. with Ihe magnitude of the effect in terms of elasddties ranging from -0-2 to -2-0. dqM-nding on population, metliods, time period, and spedfic beverage.
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Substantially fewer studies have examined the effects of alcohol prices or taxes on measures of alcohol-related morbidity or mortality, and of those that have, most have foaised on injuiy rather than disease. Of 18 studies tliat examined price or tax eftecis on tralfic cjashes, 15 found that higher alcohol prices or taxes were assodated with tewer crashes, "^^^"^ but 3 found no effect" Sloan et al. found that aloehol pricís were not related to falls, fires, or ( )ther unintentional injuiy rates, hut Ohsfeldt and Monisey"" found that hi^er beer taxes were itilated to lower rates of nonfatal industrial injuries. In addition, 8 studies (6 of whicii were (xmducted by 1 research team) found higher ala)hol prices or taxes assodated with lower morbidity or mortality fmm intentional injuries, induding assault, homidde. suidde, child abuse, and spouse abuse.""'""' However, 1 of these Objective. We evaluated the effects of tax increases on alcoholic beverages in 1983 and 2002 on alcohol-related disease mortality in Alaska.
Methods. We used a quasi-experimental design with quarterly measures of mortality from 1976 though 2004, and we included other states for comparison. Our statistical approach combined an auto regressive integrated moving average model with structural parameters in interrupted time-series models.
Results. We observed statistically significant reductions in the numbers and rates of deaths caused by alcohol-related disease beginning immediately after the 1983 and 2002 alcohol tax increases in Alaska. In terms of effect size, the reductions were-29% (Cohen's d=-0.57) and-11% (Cohen's d=-0.52) for the 2 tax increases. Statistical tests of temporary-effect models versus long-termeffect models showed little dissipation of the effect over time.
Conclusions. Increases in alcohol excise tax rates were associated with immediate and sustained reductions in alcohol-related disease mortality in Alaska. Reductions in mortality occurred after 2 tax increases almost 20 years apart. Taxing alcoholic beverages is an effective public health strategy for reducing the burden of alcohol-related disease. studies found that hi^er beer taxes were not s(red!irally related to levels of robbeiy or rape, *' f inally, a number of studies have found higher alcohol prices or taxes to be assodat«i with lower rates of alcohol def)endence'''^^ and liver drrtiosis.^'^'"*"''^ In contrast, Sdiwdtzer et aL''"' did not find a significant relationship between almhoi piices and rates of alcohol dqiendence.
To elidt more information about the effect of alcoholic bever^ie taxes on disease mortality, we examined patterns of alcohol-related disease mortality in the state of Alaska over a 29-year period to determine whether 2 major ijicreases in al(»hol tav rates, 1 in \9S3 and the other in 2002. affected alcohol-related mortality in the state.
METHODS

Research Design
I he researdi design of the study can be represented as shovm iii Figure 1 .
We utilized a time-series quasi-experimental design, which is similar to an experiment in that it is intended to identify the efïect of an i^ntervention while using comparison data series to rule out or contifil for pos.sible alternative explanfitions for the elfect '^ A good experimental design has a number of benefits: it can aUow reseajchers to eliminate many amfounding factoi-s as a tha-at to a cau,sal inteqjretation of an observed relaliondiip without the need to identify, measure, and statistit^ly contix)l for al! possible confounds; it c^an avert debates about whidi of the numerous ^xxific control variables to indude; and it can prevent researchers from intiodiidng biases into the study by induding only those control variables for which operational measuns arr available.
Given tliat .Alaska is unusual compai'ed with other states in terms of weather, population, economy, heaith, and many other factors, no other smgle state is optimal for comparison with Alaska. Therefore, we elected to use the aggregate of all other states as the comparison group. This comparison ensures that eflects observed in Alaska are not caused by any dianges in substantive factors (e.g.. economy, sodety, polity) or measurement faetore (e.g., diagnosis coding categories) that could . n represents the number of quarterly observations after the first tax increase and tiefore the second tax increase (n-77). These 2 sets of observations are summed witli 9 follow-up quarterly observations after the second tax increase, producing a total of 116 observations. RGURE 1-Representatlon of study design.
affeci observed alcohol-related mortality (ivt;r time. We liirther strengthened the study's design by t;xaniining 2 separate increases in tax rates Draining almost 20 years apart.. This element 0Ï t]ie study allowed us to test the replicability of observed effects, and it ensured Uiat observed effects were not caused by unique t; ircumstaiices not generalizable over time, thus ruling out the "contemporaneous history" llireat to internal validity Krst artiailated by ("ampbell and Stanley.'**' Moreover, a simultaneous evaluation of the efFects of the 2 lax increases allowed us tci perform a long-term follow-up evaluation of the earlier tax increase.
Data Collection
Data on alcohol tax rates in Alaska were rolledpd from a number of sources. The Alcohol Policy Information System provides summaries of US state and federal tax rates for nuillipte cliisses ot alcoholic beverages, details on changes in rates, till! legal citations, and text n om the relevant codified statutes, starting uith calendar ycai-2O()3.""^-' Data for Üie [ícHod prior to 2003 wel^* collected by experienced researcli attorneys who used standard legal research methtxis to seardi tiie records of <-(Klified statutes in Westlaw databases (http:// \%-ww.westlaw.com, fee-based membership) when a\ ailable. and who searched law library harda)py malerials tor earlier years.
Data on alcohol-related mortality outeomes were based on death certificate data oean'ded iiy the National Vital Statistics System of the National Center for Mealth Statistics, which includes all deaths occurring within the United States. We obtained the complete annual data set containing 1 record on each deceased person for each year from 1976 through 2004 from the National Bui eau of Economic Research.'" From tliese data we aeated quarterly oDUHts of deaths stratified by underlying cause of death, fii-st for Alaska and then for the other states as a gixjup.
We cumulated counts by caitse of death into 3 outcome variables. (I) AJcohol-caused mortality, which represents all deaths caused by diseases for which the alcohol-attributable fraction is 1.0 (e.g.. alcoholic liver disease. alcoliol-induced chronic pancreatitis, alcohol psychoses, alcohol abuse, alcohol dependence syndrome, alcoholic polyneuro|)athy, alcoholic cardiomyopathy, alcoholic gastritis, and acute alcohol poisoning). (2) Alcohol-related mortality, whiclT repres(;nts all deaths caused by diseases with alcohol-attributable fractions 0.35 and higher but less than 1.0 (i.e., other ciiThosis; cholelithiasis: acute and dironic pancreatitis; malignant neoplasms of the mouth, pharynx. eso])hagus, liver, and breast; epilepsy; and cardiovascular diseases including hypertension, ischemia an-hythmia, cerebrovasailar disease, and ischémie and hemorrhagic stroke). 
Statistical Analyses
Given the large number of repeated observations, we used an tqDproach that combined a Box-Jenkins autoregressive integrated moving average (AÍÍIMAJ model with structural parameters,^"' ( 1) where Yi=i to Yi^;, ai-e Ihe 3 outcome measures by quarter from t=l (first quarter 1976) through t=116 (last quarter 2004); a Ls a constant; tOi is the estimated etîcîct oí' implementation of the 1983 alcohol tax increase; Ii, is a step Huidion equal to 0 before the 1983 tax change took effect and 1 alter tlie diangt ; ui^ is the tsitimated eflect of implementation of the 2002 alcohol tax in(T(^ase; In, is a step iunction (íqual lo O before the 2002 tax diange took efíecí and 1 after the change; [i is the estimated effect of Z,, the frequííncy (or rate) of alcohol-related disease in the comparison states; y\ii is a vector of estimates that controLs for outiiws X;; 0 is the first-order seasonal moving averse parameter; u, is a random (white noise) error component; and B is the backshift operator sudi that B''(yi) equals yi_i. We used SAS version 9.1 Proc ARIMA (SAS Institute lnc, Caiy, NQ to estimate all malels, and we used a stiict sigiificance criterion of Pat less than .001 to evaluate all models for effeds of outliers. A maximum of 1 outlier was detected and conbtiQed in any model.
For each Alaska outcome measure (alcoholcaused mortidity. alcohol-related mortality, and the sum of both), 4 spedfic models were estimated: (1) frequency. (2) rate per 100000 population aged 15 years and older, (3) rate per 100000 population including the comparison states covariate. aiui (4) natural logs of rate per 100000 population including the comparison stales covariate. Krrquendes were examined for initial evidence of effects. Rates per population were examined to assess whether observed differences were caused by population changes. Then the comparison states covariate was induded to assess whether observed effects in Alaska may have been caused by other factors chaJiging over time aa oss states. The natural logs were modeled to ensure estimates were not affected by heteroscedastidty (changing variance in death rates over time). Finally, to statistically test whether the effects weie permanent or temporary, we estimated an alternative specification of the time-series model that used a first-order transfer fimcdon on the differenced tax-change variable:
where (a is the estimated shift effect of /,. representing the 1983 alcohol tax increase: S is the estimated rate of decay of the initial eiîect; and S is the backshift operator, sudi that B(IJ equals /,./. If the estimated value for ô in sudi a model is very dose to unity, the effect is longterm and does not dissipate. If the estimate of 5 is less than 1. the immediate effed decays over time. See chapter 3 of McCieaiy and Hay''" fora detailed description of transfer-function modeling that is aaîessible to noastadsticians.
.Ml of the models fit the data well Eind exfilained substantial proportions of the variance in deaths over time. Models of frequendes had R^ of O.f)8 to 0.72 (after adjustment for number of degrees of freedom used in the [node]). Given that rates or ratios naturally have substantially higher measurement error do tlian the numerator frequendes alone, adjusted /f"' for those modeLs was somewhat lower, ranging from 0.13 to 0.33. Finally, parametei-estimates in terms of change in Irequency or population rate of death were transformed into 2 standardized metrics of elTed: percentage change in the outcome based on the average of the 4 quarters immediately ¡.trior to a given tax rate diaiige, and Cohen's i/.**^ Ihe effed: size in standard deviation unil5, ralailated with Uie raw stantiard deviation of the outcome over the entii-e data serira. Percentage change is a commonly used, easily tinderstood metric of interest to prevention practitioners and ! )olic>Tnakt;rs. and the Colien's d efFed size perniits comparison of effect sizes across a wide range of intervention and outcome domains.
RESULTS
Results shiiw statistically significant reductions in the ntmibcrs of deaths caused by alcohol-related disease beginning immediately aller the 1983 and 2002 alcohol tax increases in Alaska (lable 1), Estimated reductions in mortality are of clear substantive importance: ihc 198,3 tax increase was followed by a -29"/(i change in numberofdeaths (23 deaths averted per year), and the 2002 tax increase was followed by a -11% change in deaths (an additional 21 deaths averted f)er year). In terms of ( 'ohen's d effect size, the reductions were -0.57 and -0.52 for the 2 tax increases, re-|)ectively, in chronological order. These effects iii-e lar^ enoi^ to be dearly discernible from a plot of the data (Figure 2) , especially for the 1983 policy change, for which a 19-year follow-up period is available.
We analyzed the death rate to control for changes in size of the population over time, bul Ulis analysis did not appreciably change the estimated effecLs (Figure 3) . Percentage reductions in alcohol-related mortality declined slightly to -23% for the 1983 tax increase and increased slightly to -13% for the 2002 increase. Estimated Cohen's d effect sizes for the tax increases were larger for tlie rate per 100000 population measure than for the analyses of raw numbers of deaths (-0.88 and -0.79). These results confirm that observed effects of the tax policy changes are not ^trib-utable to overall changes in population.
We obtained a third set of effect estimates by adding the comparison states to the model, to determine whether observed alcohol-tax efFects in Alaska reflected mortality reductions caused by any of a number of other possible factors operating across stales. Again, there was no ^preciable change in the estimates. states did not experience the mortality declines that Alaska experienced, and the effects observed for Alaska caimot be attributed to broader trends or other factors experienced across tlie other states. Repeating this model on the natural logs of tlie deatli rate did not change the findings. Finally, the estimates and standard errors in 1 able 1 show that the magnitudes of the effects of Uie 2 tax crhangcs were not significantly different from eadi other.
The second and thii'd pajiels of Table 1 provide these same estimates of effect sepaiately for 2 subsets of the overtdl outcome measure:
(1) alcohol-caused mortality, for which the alcohol-attiibu table fraction is 1.0, and (2) alcohol-related mortality, for which the alcoholattributable fraction ranges from 0-35 to 0.99. In tlie second subset, it is not known witli certainty wiiether any individual death was caused by alcohol, but as the sample increases in size we are increasingly confident in the proportion of deaths that were caused by alcohol. WP found no significant (lilTcrences in tlic magnitudes of tlie estimated elTecls of the 2 tax changes across these 2 outoeme subsets (Tiible 1). The sole obvious consequence of disaggregating the outcome is increased variability of the estimates {increased standard errors), an expectfîd result of the smaller and more variable nioriality cjiunLs in tin; sub.set analy.ses.
An examination of the actual deatli counts by quarter (Figure 2 ) could bf inteipreted to mean tliat tbe obviou.s sudden effed of the 1983 tax increase dissipated over time, becau.se after 5 years die average numbers of deaths per quarter returned to tlie levels tliey were immediately before the policy cbangc-. Simple comparisons of the linear slopes of the pre-1983 and post-1983 periods show that they aje similar (pre-1983 slope^0.21 vs post-1983 slope=0.32), hut the slightly larger post-1983 slope might be interpreted as a dissipation of the effect seen in tbe sudden intercept difference in 1983. However, additional analyses that directly tested alternative hypotheses assuming lemporaiy versus permanent (îffcicts demonstrated tbe effect did not dissipate over time. Wlien we used the temporary-impact model specilication, the estimate of O) remained essentially the same (-5.06, SE=1.83). bul Ihe estimate of the decay parameter 5 was 0.98 (SE=0.03), very near unity, demonstrating that the effect did not decay over tirae."' Moreover, the residual variance of the temporary-effect model was lai-ger tliaii that of the permaiient-eftect model, iiidicatiiig poorer tit of the tcmporaiy-effecl model. Wien we repeated this procecitire on the popiilatioii-ialc outcome variable, we ^ain found no dissipation of effect over time. Similar statistjcal tests oi' pennanent versus temporary effecti tor the 2002 tax change are not yet possible, because only 9 postdiange data points are currently available.
DISCUSSION
Wo found t}iat increases in alcoholic beverage tax rates were assodated witli significant and substantial reductions of alcohol-related dLsease mortality in Alaska. Reductions in mortality were observed for 2 tax increases 19 years apart, indicating that the observed effects cannot be attributed to a single historical period or event, atypical or otherwise. The longterm foDoW' Up after the first tax increaoe allowed us to determine tliat the effect was not temporary, but was maintained over time. Our quasi-experimental research design included other states as a comparison group, demonstrating tJiat the effects observed for mortality in Alaska were not caused by broader national trends, factors affecting mortality in common ao'oss states, or a sudden change experienced across states in 1983 or 2002.
Our results are consistent v^nth basic economic theory and econometric analyses of the price elasticity of alcoholic beverages, which holt! that an increased tax on beverage alcohol is presumed to raise the price to consumers, who respond by purchasing and drinking less alcohol. Lower alcohol consumption is then thought to reduce risk of death caused by a range of alcohol-related diseases, resulting in a decline in mortality counts and rates. Our study validated this account by demonstrating a clear link between the first and last factors in this presumed mechanism of effect (alcobol-tax increases and alcohol-related mortality). Complete and acairate c]uarterly measures of tbe 2 central intei"vening factors-retail prices and drinking behaviors-are not available for the 29-year period studied. However, the theory underlying tJiis mechanism of effect is so well established that a lack of measures for each intervening effect does not reduce the plausibility of Üie findings.
A colleague and a reviewer both sou^t to explain the fact that the effect of the 1983 tax increase appears to be lai'ger than the eflect of the 2002 tax increase, as shown in the percentage-change column in Table 1 . Several reasonable hypotheses qiiicJily come to mind. For example, general price inflation means that any given alcohol tax increase in dollars per gallon (as alcohol taxes often are measured, rather than as a [jercentage of the sale price) would likely be a larger proportion of the total retail price of a product in 1983 than in 2002. However, close examination of the estimates and standard errors in T^le 1 äiows no significant diffei'ences betu'een estimates of tlie effects of the 2 dianges. Moreover, we only had access to 2.25 years of follow-up data for the 2002 tax change. Detennination of whether the 2 tax changes bad sig?iificantly different longterm magnitude of effect and the possible causes of sudi differences (if any), requires waiting for additional follow-up data to become available. Some questions might be raised about the timing of observed effects of alcoholtax increases. For instance, scientists and practitioners who focus on individual-level disease may find the claim that immediate population-level effects on mortality can be caused by modest changes in the social environment to be biologically implausible and "counterintuitive," as a reviewer of this article said. A few of the spedfic causes of death included in our outcome measures are tlie result of the acute toxic effects of ethanol ingestion (e.g.. poisoning), but most are chronic conditions that result from decades of high exposures to ethanol (e.g., cin'hosis or cancer). However, mortality eaused by long-term, dironic alcohol use responds immediately to a change in drinking levels, because at any given time there is a reservoir of individuals in the population who are about to die from a chronic alcohol-related disease.'''' Even modest reductions in current drinking immediately retanls progression of alcohol-related disease for this population, resulting i]i an immediate reduction in tlie death rate, as fouiul in tlie piesent study.
In this regard, alcohol-related disease Ls not unlike some other diseases, such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), Chronic, long-term exposure to air polludon is one cause of COPD.'^' ' Development of COPO resulting from exposui-e to urban air pollution levels usually t^es decades.^ Nevertiieless. sudden reductions in ambient air pollution result in immediate reductions in COPD mortality. Pope et al. reviewed 18 "striking studies ... that observed changes in daily death oeunt.s assodated with short-term cbanges in parüciilate air ponution."^^'"^'^' This pattern of immediate population-level changes in mortality occurs foi" both COPD and alcohol-related disease, and Ibr the same reason: at any given moment in time, there are many in the ¡wpulation whose cumulative exposure (to poDution or alcohol) is near the tlireshold that will cause death, and a reduction in current exposui'e delays deaüi, A trajectoiy or cascade of delayed individual deaths results in population mortality declines that begin immediately when tíie exposure reductions occur.
Another question that could be raised about the time-ordered pattern of observed effects is related to the continual gradual reduction in real (inflation adjusted) alcohol taxes over time. Table 2 shows the Alaska tax rates immediately before and after each tax change in constant 2006 dollars (adjusted by the consumer price index for urban consumers in Anchorage**''), For example, the beei' tax increased fix)m $0. evidence of sudi dissipation of effect. Perfiaps the sudden decline in drinking caused by increased prices tistabdsheci new normative and behavioral patterns that then were maintained in the face of a gi'adua] elimination oF the oiiginíü price inaïMse Üial stûnulated the réduction in consumption.
There is a need for additional study ofthe effects of stidden tax or price increases on drinkingrelattîd normative expectatioas and behavior p^lenis. Tlie reduction of the real tax rate in Alaska also raises (he plausible hypoüiesis that the siibsiantial effects obsei-vetl here would be significantly larger if sudi tax inereeses were maintaiiied in real dollars via Indeîdng to inflation.
Our study limited its focus to an evaluation of the effects of changing alcohol taxes on alcoholrelated disease; we did not study mortality caused by the many categories of unintentional or intentional injury that have substantial fractions attributable to alcohol (e.g.. traffic crashes, homicide, suidde), A replication of this reseai'ch tocused on injury morbidity and mortality is warranted. In addition, we limited our scope to mortality changes in Alaska; replic^on of the study for other states is also warranted.
In conclusion. Alaska's alcohol tax increases resulted in large (ranging from 11% to 29%) reductions in deaths caused by alcohol-related disease. The effect sizes are large compared with other efforts to prevent negative outcomes related to alcohol consumption. Three metaanalyses of eflbrts to prevent individual-and school-level alcohol problems show effect sizes ranging from d at -0.02 to rfat-0.36,'^'"'"''' meaning that alcohol taxes had an effect 2 to 4 times largei-than did other common prevention effoiis. The size of tiie alcohol-tax effect is even more notewortliy given that state tax policy affects tile entire population of a state, ratlier tlian the relatively small niunbers of individuals aflected by most other prevention programs. In addition, state alcohol taxation systems aie already in place, so there are viitualiy no additional implementation aists assodated with the large benefit to public liealth to be obtained by increases in alcohol taxes.
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